Friday, April 22, 2011

Gleg releases Ver 1.1 of the SCADA+ Pack for Canvas

Gleg Ltd. annouced the availability of Release 1.1 of the SCADA+ pack for Immunity's Canvas.

Here are the details of the release contents:

Monday, April 11, 2011

White Phosphorus Exploit Pack Ver 1.11 Released for Immunity Canvas

Version 1.11 of the White Phosphorus exploit pack is now ready, and contains
5 new exploit modules, including one for SCADA.

Sunday, April 3, 2011

CIP-002-4 “Bright Line” Secures 163 Plants, Max

(Copied from blog "Findings from the Field" posted April 3, 2011 by Andrew Ginter)

In the 2009 statistics, the latest available, NERC tracked some 10,500 generators with a nameplate capacity of 0.1 MW or higher, at about 5700 sites. The new NERC CIP-002 version 4 “bright line” rule says NERC-CIP applies to only those generating sites with “an aggregate highest rated net Real Power capability of the preceding 12 months equal to or exceeding 1500 MW in a single Interconnection.” How many locations/plants is that? According to NERC, only 163 sites have a nameplate generating capability of 1500 MW or greater, and there is no word yet on how many of those plants are exempt because they feed less than 1500 MW into any one interconnection.

Saturday, April 2, 2011

Russian Security Team to Upgrade Agora SCADA+ Exploit Tool for Canvas

(Originally posted in PC World, March 25 by Jeremy Kirk, IDG News and edited by SCADAhacker) 

A Russian security company plans to release an upgraded exploit pack for industrial control software that incorporates a raft of new vulnerabilities released by an Italian security researcher [on March 21].

Friday, April 1, 2011

More SCADA Security Threats: Where There’s Smoke, There’s Fire

One of the unfortunate facts about security is that if you can find one vulnerability, you can usually find lots more. Vulnerabilities are not just bad luck – they are caused by a poor Software Security Assurance (SSA) process (or a complete lack of one). Next in line for blame are experienced professionals who do little in terms of security assessments prior to commissioning systems in actual production facilities.

So what about the four SCADA / HMI products that have Luigi Auriemma’s 34 Zero-day vulnerabilities? Would any of those have additional vulnerabilities, just waiting to be exposed to the world? After all, Luigi claims to have spent only two days per product. That isn’t much time – what if someone else started looking harder. So we decided to give it a shot.